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Metaphor
Abstract
Metaphor plays a major role in our understanding of language and of the
world we use language to talk about. Consequently, theories of language
comprehension and of language itself are incomplete if they do not handle
the phenomenon of metaphor, and they are inadequate if they cannot.
Traditional definitions and theories of metaphor are reviewed. It is
suggested that they err in equating metaphors with comparisons rather than
merely implicating comparisons. Empirical research is reviewed, revealing,
for the most part, serious problems, particularly in the developmental
research. These problems often relate to inadequate underlying theories
about the nature of metaphor. Other difficulties include inadequate
controls over preexisting knowledge, and overly hasty conclusions that
children cannot understand metaphors. Related research on the
comprehension of proverbs and analogies is discussed. Some recommendations
for future research are made. These depend on a redefinition of metaphor
and on the employment of an investigative approach that will permit
adequate controls of preexisting knowledge, surface structure, and meaning.
The approach recommended emphasizes and takes advantage of the context-
dependent nature of metaphors. Finally, the role of comparisons is
reexamined. It is of no avail to argue that metaphors are really implicit
comparisons if, in so doing, one hopes to account for or explain their
nonliteral nature. For even if metaphors can be transformed into
comparisons, these comparisons are themselves nonliteral, and consequently
still need to be explained.
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Metaphor: Theoretical and Empirical Research
In the simplest and most obvious case of language comprehension,
readers or listeners understand what they read or hear in terms of a
literal interpretation of what is written or said. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the bulk of research in the psychology of language
comprehension has concerned itself with the comprehension of literal uses
of language. However, in both written and oral language it very often
happens that speakers or writers do not intend what they say to be taken
literally; if it is taken literally, it often either makes no sense at all
with respect to the surrounding context, or it appears to express something
that is either impossible or false. It is our thesis that if research into
the comprehension of natural language is to have ecological validity, it is
necessary that we go beyond the more traditional research goals, and extend
our investigations to nonliteral uses of language, which, together with
literal uses, constitute the whole range of linguistic communication.
One class of nonliteral uses of language that has recently started to
receive attention from psychologists is "indirect speech acts." This class
is not of primary concern here (but see Clark & Lucy, 1975; Schweller,
Brewer & Dahl, 1976). Rather, we are concerned with metaphor and related
figurative uses of language such as similes and, to some extent,
analogies. Throughout our review we use the term metaphor somewhat
loosely; sometimes we use is narrowly to refer to specific utterances that
are, or contain metaphors in the usual sense of the word; sometimes we use
it more broadly to refer to related nonliteral uses of language such as
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similes or analogies.
Extant theory and research concerning the development of the
production and comprehension of metaphor yields numerous opinions and
contradictory findings. For example, one group of studies (characterized by
the work of Gardner, 1974; Pollio & Pollio, 1974) has suggested that even
young children (age 5 or younger) are capable of using and understanding
figurative language. Other research (Asch & Nerlove, 1960; Schaffer, 1930),
however, suggests that these capacities do not emerge until the child
reaches adolescence. This kind of inconsistency is not uncommon in
developmental research.
Implicit in our review is the suggestion that one of the reasons for the
inconsistency of research findings in the area of the comprehension of metaphor
is that the research seems not to have been grounded in an adequate understanding
of what metaphor is. This is no criticism of the theorists whose work we review;
it seems to be endemic in the history of thought about the problem. Metaphors
may be easy to recognize, but they are difficult to define. It is not easy to
give a psychological analysis of an ill-understood notion. This lack of
understanding, however, is not widely acknowledged, and entrenched beliefs
about metaphor are ubiquitous. Among these are such dubious claims as:
Metaphors are comparisons; metaphors are (must be) semantic anomalies; and
the folklore of classrooms and editors -- metaphors, like drinks, should
never be mixed. As this review proceeds, we hope to show that the first
two claims are false, but we will digress here to discuss the mixing of
metaphors. First, let it be said that to our knowledge there is no theory
of metaphor, no theory of language comprehension, and probably no theory of
Metaphor
4
literary style that has the dictum, "Don't mix metaphors," as a
consequence. Indeed, the dictum is probably as groundless as many others
in the educational folklore of English teaching. Why should one not split
infinitives? Why should one use that rather than which? And, as Winston
Churchill once objected, why should one not end sentences with
prepositions? Churchill's objection was voiced in the House of Commons
when he finished a sentence with the phrase, "up with which I will not
put," to demonstrate the absurdity of the dictum. Mixed metaphors, far
from being heinous, can be very powerful and often rather amusing. In the
1976 campaign for the Republican party presidential nomination Ronald
Reagan probably expressed his intentions very vividly when he complained
that the ship of state was sailing the wrong way down a one-way street!
Canons of style should be recognized for the more or less widely held
conventions they are, not confused with constraints imposed by a theory of
language.
In a recent review of metaphor and psychological theory, Billow (1977)
cited some of the studies that we do, but his perspective was rather
different from ours and was certainly broader. For example, without
comment, he cited a Freudian interpretation of I've wandered off the point
and can't find it again (Sharpe, 1968, p. 159) as a metaphor referring to
subconscious childhood failures of attempts to reach the mother's nipple.
Billow acknowledged the confused state of the art by noting that "theory is
incomplete and research is nonconclusive" (p. 89). This review attempts to
identify the causes of this state of affairs and offers some suggested
remedies.
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Traditional Theories of Metaphor
Although philosophers have been interested in the nature of metaphor
at least since the time of Aristotle, there seems to have been relatively
little progress since that time. It is our contention that a prime reason
for this is the relative inexactness and inadequacy of the dominant
philosophical theories and definitions of metaphor. A good definition is
needed, not, as Richards (1936) claimed "to protect our natural skill from
the interference of unnecessarily crude views" (p. 116) but to explicate
that natural skill.
For a long time, metaphors were considered to be merely the direct
substitution of a nonliteral phrase for a literal phrase that had exactly
the same meaning. Black (1962), in discussing this substitution view,
presented two reasons why authors would desire to replace a straightforward
statement of what is meant with an imprecise phrase, the meaning of which
must be deduced. The first reason was stylistic. Metaphors serve an
ornamental function. In addition, the reader is supposed to feel delight
at the discovery of the hidden meaning. Second, metaphors were seen as
useful in coining terms for new concepts, such as the leg of a triangle
(Breal, 1897/1964). The substitution view allowed metaphor only a minor
role in language. In fact, it led directly to the conclusion that the use
of metaphor was an affectation that only obscured literal meaning. A
modern example of such an opinion can be found in Miller (1976), who
maintained that "metaphors are often used in a misleading way to play upon
the emotions or to carry an argument by means of distortion and
overemphasis" (p. 174). Other approaches, however, have allowed metaphor
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to play a more important role in language functioning and development.
In our discussion, wherever possible, we employ the terminology
developed by Richards (1936). This terminology is both useful and widely
accepted. Richards argued that a metaphor consists of two terms and the
relationship between them. The subject term he called the "topic," or
"tenor;" the term being used metaphorically, the "vehicle;" and the
relationship, or that which the two have in common, he called the "ground."
For example, in the metaphor, The question of federal aid to parochial
schools is a bramble patch (cited in Barlow, Kerlin & Pollio, Note 1), the
topic is federal aid to parochial schools, the vehicle is bramble patch,
and the ground is the idea of impenetrable complication. Richards further
introduced the notion of "tension" to denote the literal incompatibility of
the topic and the vehicle. In the example above, the metaphorical tension
arises from the literal incompatibility of federal aid and bramble
patches. The identification of these various components of metaphor is not
always as straightforward as in the example just given, but as an
analytical tool, Richards' terminology is often useful.
The Comparison Theory
From antiquity to the present the most widespread view of the nature
of metaphor is that it is essentially a comparison between, or
juxtaposition of objects that are literally disparate (Perrine, 1971;
Barlow et al., Note 1). The exact nature of the comparison and the
resulting implications concerning the use and comprehension of metaphor
have varied from author to author. Some have argued, as did Aristotle,
that metaphors are comparisons based on analogy or proportions. Others
Metaphor
7
(e.g., Alston, 1964) have argued that it is little more than implicit
simile.
Since the comparison theory of metaphor originates in the writings of
Aristotle, mainly in De Poetica (see McKeon, 1947), it is appropriate to
consider his views first. Two aspects of metaphor recur in his treatment
of the topic. The first is that metaphor is constructed on the principles
of analogy and seems to be concerned primarily with the comparison of
similarities between two or more objects. A second interesting aspect of
Aristotle's view of metaphor concerns the range of metaphor usage in
natural language. Aristotle believed the command of metaphor to be a sign
of genius. According to this view metaphors are infrequent and are used
almost primarily for stylistic purposes, to make language more elegant and
beautiful rather than more meaningful. The most important contribution
that Aristotle made to the study of metaphor was to initiate the still
prevalent idea that metaphors are comparisons. At the same time he seems
to have confused the relationship between metaphors and analogies (see the
last section of this paper), and to have underestimated their influence on
the nature of language.
In his famous book Essai de Semantique (wherein the word semantics was
coined) Breal (1897/1964) took exception to Aristotle's implicit notion
that the ability to use metaphor was an uncommon occurrence. He suggested
that metaphor was a basic component of language use, rather than an
ornament of language, as Aristotle had maintained. Breal claimed that
Metaphor
8
the metaphor remains such at the outset only; soon the mind becomes
accustomed to the image; its very success causes it to pale; it fades
into a representation of the idea scarcely more coloured than the
proper word...it must be admitted that for the most part metaphors
teach us little save what we knew already; they demonstrate only the
universal intelligence, which does not vary from one nation to
another. (p. 122)
For Breal, the original use of metaphor is common among most language users
and is an important vehicle for language change. Some of these views were
later to be echoed by Skinner (1957), although, of course, in a somewhat
different context.
Stated in more modern terms, Breal also made a distinction between
"novel" and "frozen" metaphor. In discussing this distinction, it is
perhaps useful to think in terms of a continuum, with frozen or dead
metaphors at one end and novel metaphors at the other. Frozen metaphors
would be defined as metaphors that at one time were novel but through
consistent use have become integrated into the language. Phrases like head
of state and foot of the bed are examples of frozen metaphors, as are many
colloquial and idiomatic expressions. In contrast, truly novel metaphors
constitute an original contribution to the expressive power of the
language. Most of the metaphors occurring in everyday language probably
lie somewhere near the middle of the continuum rather than at either of the
extremes. They are not totally original to each person who uses them, but
they are not frozen either.
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Embler (1966) took Breal's thesis one step further by suggesting that
metaphor was not only a building block of language but also the essential
transporter of meaning in language. Embler claimed that "both speech and
thought are often fuzzy and vague, often poverty-stricken, often mere
counters of approval or disapproval, often abstractions that have lost
their power of expressiveness. But, if there is meaning at all, it is in
the metaphor still" (p. 44).
Barlow et al. (Note 1) presented a simple comparison view of metaphor
as part of a more general classification scheme for nonliteral language.
Following Corbett (1965), they defined a metaphor as "an implied comparison
between two things of unlike nature that have something in common" (p. 4).
Using simple, indeed oversimple examples, such as my mind is a blank, they
argued that the attributes of the vehicle are compared to those of the
topic in order to generate the "meaning" of the metaphor. Other authors
have developed more complex accounts.
For example, Campbell (1975) presented a theory of metaphor as
comparison in which every metaphor is an implicit oxymoron. An oxymoron is
a juxtaposition of two concepts that have opposite (as opposed to merely
different or incompatible) meanings, such as the soft harshness of words.
Even metaphors that do not contain such obvious opposites can be thought of
as oxymorons because the tension in the metaphorical comparison comes about
as a result of the incompatibility of the literal meaning of the topic and
vehicle of the metaphor. Although the sphere of nonliteral language
delimited by metaphors was not made explicit, Campbell had strong opinions
about the implications of his view of metaphor for cognitive and linguistic
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theory. The power of metaphor comes from its inability to be paraphrased.
Campbell noted that "the more powerful the metaphor, the easier it is to
perceive the multiple meanings nestled therein" (p. 8). These multiple
meanings are, however, not static. New meanings can evolve for different
individuals at different times. Therefore, any attempted literal
paraphrase will of necessity miss some part of the metaphor's meaning.
Campbell also noted that the multiple meanings of metaphor and the
intelligible presence of opposites in the same sentence provide difficulty
for many theories of semantic processing. Campbell was probably right
about this, but the only theory he discussed in detail was the semantic
theory of Katz and Fodor (1963), which is not a processing theory at all.
The Interaction Theory
Several authors (Black, 1962; Haynes, 1975; Richards, 1936;
Wheelwright, 1962) have maintained that although metaphors can be merely
substitutes for literal statements, and although they can be comparisons
between objects, the psychologically interesting metaphors really involve
more. Good metaphors actually relate the topic and the vehicle to produce
a resulting meaning that is new and transcends both. As Haynes (1975) puts
it:
Placing known characteristics of Y against X may provide new insights,
either about Y or about X or about a new third Z, an irreducible
synthesis by juxtaposition which is difficult to reduce to a simi le or
literal language -- the metaphor creates the similarity rather than
[formulating] similarity previously existing. (p. 273)
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Black (1962) viewed the interaction approach to metaphor as
highlighting an interplay between both of the two major components (topic
and vehicle) of metaphor, which he called the principal subject and the
subsidiary subject. The metaphor works by selecting or suppressing
features of the principal subject by using features from the subsidiary
subject. For Black, an interaction metaphor could be characterized by the
following conditions:
1. The metaphor has two subjects -- a principle subject and a
subsidiary one.
2. These subjects are often regarded as "systems of things" rather
than "things."
3. The metaphor works by applying to the principal subject a system
of "associated implications" characteristic of the subsidiary subject.
4. These implications usually consist of "commonplaces" about the
subsidiary subject, but may, in suitable cases, consist of deviant
implications established ad hoc by the writer.
5. The metaphor selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes
features of the principal subject by implying statements about it that
normally apply to the subsidiary subject.
6. This involves shifts in meaning of words belonging to the same
family or system as the metaphorical expression; and some of these shifts,
though not all, may be metaphorical transfers....
7. There is, in general, no simple "ground" for the necessary shifts
of meanings -- no blanket reason why some metaphors work and others fail.
(p. 44)
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Black suggested that since both substitution and comparison metaphors can
be replaced by literal translation, they could be dropped from language
with no loss of cognitive content. Interaction metaphors, however, are not
expendable because they require readers to make inferences and to draw
implications rather than merely to react.
Wheelwright (1962), in his influential text, Metaphor and Reality,
proposed what he called a "tensive view" of metaphor. His concepts,
however, seem amenable to interpretation in a broad interaction sense and
are therefore discussed here. He analyzed metaphor into two component
types, epiphor and diaphor. Epiphor "starts by assuming a usual meaning
for a word; [then applies] that word to something else on the basis of, and
in order to indicate a comparison with what is familiar" (p. 72). In
essence, Wheelwright's notion of epiphor encompasses metaphor in the
conventional sense, as we have discussed it. It expresses a similarity
between relatively well known and relatively unknown subjects. His
conception of diaphor, however, seems to add a new dimension to metaphor as
previously discussed. Diaphor is exemplified by "'movement' (phora)
'through' (dia) certain particulars of experience in a fresh way, producing
new meaning by juxtaposition alone" (p. 78). In other words, phrases and
sentences that may or may not be metaphorical in their own right can create
a metaphorical image when placed together in a communication. Wheelwright
presented an example of diaphor: My country 'tis of thee, sweet land of
liberty, higgledy-piggledy my_ black hen (p. 78). Apparently, the intention
here is not to say anything concerning hens or countries but to make an
unpatriotic statement. In diaphor, context, with all of its nuances, is
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introduced into the study of metaphor.
The interaction view of metaphor approaches metaphor functionally
rather than grammatically. Thus, instead of arguing that a metaphor is a
simile without the word like or as, a true metaphor, for the
interactionist, is characterized by a "eureka" effect, as the elements
blend and the new whole is recognized. Haynes (1975) specifically
mentioned that even similes can have this characteristic if the tensive
force in the simile is great enough, as in, for example, My Luve's like a
red, red rose.
Now, it may be true that proponents of the interaction view see
metaphor in a radically different way from proponents of the comparison
view, but it may be that interaction metaphors could be handled by
comparison theorists. To see how this might be, it is useful to review the
four-category classification scheme for metaphors and comparisons proposed
by Perrine (1971). These categories represent the four possible
combinations of explicit and implicit topics and vehicles. The first
category is the one in which both the topic and vehicle are explicitly
stated. Such a metaphor might be the issue of federal aid to parochial
schools is a bramble patch. Here, federal aid to parochial schools is
apparently being explicitly compared to a bramble patch. A second category
contains metaphors in which the real vehicle is not explicitly stated,
though the real topic is. One of Perrine's examples of this category was
sheathe thy impatience. The topic is impatience and the unstated vehicle
is sword. The metaphor, he claimed, compares the two. The third category
that Perrine described contains metaphors in which the vehicle is
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explicitly stated but the topic is not. Many proverbs fall into this
category. For example, in Don't put the cart before the horse, the topic
is some unstated action having the characteristic of being potentially out
of sequence. Finally, the fourth category consists of metaphors in which
neither the topic nor the vehicle is explicitly stated, such as Let us eat,
drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we shall die, when used not to encourage
merrymaking, but to assert that life is short and should be enjoyed while
it can.
Of Perrine's four categories of metaphors, it seems that only
metaphors in the first category (those having an explicit topic and
vehicle) would be considered by interactionists as metaphors of comparison.
The examples that the interactionists give to illustrate the process of
interaction, however, could be merely examples of the other three kinds of
comparisons. If this is true, then the eureka aspect of interaction
metaphors, referred to by Haynes (1975), may really be only the result of
discovering what the real vehicle and/or topic of the metaphor is.
Whether or not this is the correct interpretation, the interaction
view presents an interesting picture of the power and usefulness of
metaphor. Wheelwright (1962) held that "in order to speak as precisely as
possible about the vague, shifting, problematic and often paradoxical
phenomena that are an essential part of the world, language must adapt
itself somehow to these characteristics" (p. 43). Thus figurative
language, especially metaphor, is essential to creative thought. We.cannot
speak of new perceptions and insights about how objects or ideas fit
together in terms of language that has only fixed meanings. These views
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have been echoed by Haynes (1975), who believed that the new insight
provided by a good metaphor suggests further questions, "tempting us to
formulate hypotheses which turn out to be experimentally fertile" (p. 274).
She suggested that good metaphors can literally lead to reasoning by
analogy, which can give further insight into the extent and nature of
concept interrelation, both in suggesting theoretical tests of hypotheses
and in personal world views. An example in the scientific domain would be
the comparison between the atom and the solar system, which suggested a new
view of atoms and led to innovative experimentation to explore the extent
of the analogy.
Summary
Although metaphors have generally been regarded as serving only a
communicative function, some theorists have argued that they play a much
greater role in language and cognition. This for example, was Breal's
(1897/1964) position. However, care has to be taken not to overstate this
position. For instance, Shibles (1974), represents an extreme case of this
approach, viewing everything as metaphor. He viewed metaphors as
nonliteral statements or representations of something else, thus permitting
the term to cast its net too widely. According to this view, all of
language and cognition is metaphorical. Consider, for example, the noun.
A noun is not the same as the object(s) it designates; it only stands for
the concept. Therefore, Shibles believed, a noun is a metaphor. Likewise,
such things as definitions, theories, systems of equations, and models are
not the phenomena they hope to describe; they are only our descriptions of
those phenomena. They designate only the features of the phenomena that
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appear to be useful or consistent to us, according to our current
knowledge. In other words, they are metaphors. Such a view of metaphor
defines a domain too broad and too general to be useful. It requires that
we still designate a subdomain of interest, namely, that domain covered by
what we normally call metaphors, which leads us back to the original
problem of definition. If literal uses of language are really
metaphorical, as Shibles' view implies, we still need to ask how those uses
generally regarded as nonliteral are different.
It would seem that one should reject those accounts of metaphor that
trivialize it by assigning it an insignificant role in language and
cognition. There are good reasons for rejecting simple substitution views,
for example. By the same token, views that are all embracing have to be
rejected, for they distinguish nothing. Our own view is that metaphor is a
pervasive, powerful, and necessary phenomenon that needs to be accounted
for in both linguistic theory and psychological theory.
Metaphors serve many functions. They are vehicles for linguistic
change, as Breal saw. This change is effected by the gradual absorption
into the lingua franca of expressions that were once novel. We no longer
think of cars running, or of legs of triangles, or of catching colds, as
metaphors. The emergence of such dead metaphors in a language attests to
the fact that there are gaps in what is, or was, literally expressible.
Thus, one of the functions of metaphors must be to permit the communication
of things that cannot (or could not) be literally expressed. They permit
the formulation and recognition of new relationships (Campbell, 1975;
Ortony, 1975, 1976; Wheelwright, 1962). In view of this, it is not
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surprising to find claims that metaphors are powerful in their capacity to
relate new knowledge to old. Consequently, they are said to have great
pedagogical value (Green, 1971; Ortony, 1975). It can also be argued (see
Ortony, 1975) that they may provide the possibility of communicating a more
holistic and vivid impression of a phenomenon.
If metaphors have these features, then elements of both the comparison
theory and the interaction theory come into play. On the other hand, it is
by no means clear that metaphors are comparisons, although it is clear that
they may involve comparisons. It is surely true that metaphors are
sometimes used for the purpose of making or indicating a comparison, but on
other occasions they may be used to engender a new way of seeing things, as
the interaction view emphasizes. Thus, a more cautious account of the
relationship between metaphors and comparisons would be to invoke the
making of comparisons as a component in the process of comprehending
metaphors rather than as necessarily the end result of that process. If,
by way of explanation, it is asserted that metaphors are comparisons, we'
need to explain the difference between literal and metaphorical
comparisons, a difference to which we wi ll return in due course.
Review of Empirical Research
In spite of the lack of unanimity as to the nature and function of
metaphor, there has been some empirical research that examines various
aspects of the comprehension and production of metaphors both by children
and adults. Our review is of selected work and is by no means exhaustive,
but the research that we discuss is representative.
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Developmental Research
Developmental research into the comprehension of metaphor is becoming
quite a fashionable pastime. It is a topic that is appearing more and more
frequently in the pages of leading developmental journals. This increasing
interest is an excellent sign, for questions concerning the child's ability
to comprehend metaphors are not only of theoretical interest but of
practical importance as well, particularly in reading. It appears to be
the case that children need to be able to understand metaphors to
understand the texts that they typically encounter in school. For example,
Arter (1976) conducted an informal survey of readers and introductory
social science texts that are widely read by fifth and sixth grade
children. She found that in the Ginn 360 Reading Series, figurative
language occurred at the rate of about 10 instances per 1,000 words. Even
for the earlier grades (Ginn 360, Primer Level) the rate was about 2.5 per
1,000 words of text. Although a more detailed analysis of the frequency
and use of metaphors in reading materials would yield more precise results,
it is evident that in order to understand many school texts, children have
to understand the metaphors that occur in them. It thus becomes important
to know whether there are cognitive constraints on the comprehension of
metaphor by children. If there are, then one needs to understand the
relationship between the literal uses of language that children can
understand, and the nonliteral uses that they perhaps cannot.
Asch and Nerlove (1960) examined the development of "double function"
terms in children. Double function terms were defined as words that can
refer to either physical or psychological phenomena. The physical
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application was held to be literal, and the psychological application was
regarded as metaphoric. Forty children between the ages of 3 and 12 were
tested. Asch and Nerlove chose eight double function words, sweet, hard,
cold, soft, bright, deep, warm, and crooked, and asked their subjects
whether such terms could be applied to people. Children who said they
could, were asked what such a person would be like and whether there was
any connection between this and the physical meaning. Their results
showed:
1. Children first master the object reference (i.e., the literal use)
of double function terms.
2. Children acquire the psychological (i.e., metaphorical) sense of
these terms later, and then apparently as a separate meaning, as if it were
independent of the object reference.
3. The dual property of the terms is realized last, and even then,
not spontaneously. (p. 55)
Asch and Nerlove concluded that the capacity to appreciate and produce good
metaphors does not emerge until adolescence. There are some problems with
this study, however. First, it could be argued that the double function
terms that Asch and Nerlove investigated are ambiguous terms, having at
least two distinct lexical entries. If this is the case, it would not be
surprising to find that the psychological senses of them develop later, on
the grounds that the domains to which they can be applied are less well
understood by younger children. That the terms are not perceived as being
related by children in fact provides some evidence for the ambiguity
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interpretation. Consequently, the findings may have little to do with the
development of the capacity to understand metaphors at all. A second
problem concerns the relationship between comprehending metaphors and
explaining the basis of the putative comprehension. To investigate
cognitive/linguistic skills by making demands on metacognitive/linguistic
skills is not a very promising approach. To be sure, if children can
explain how they interpreted something, then one can draw inferences about
their comprehension skills (as well as their skill at understanding their
comprehension and articulating it). But the fact that a child cannot
report how he or she understood something does not in itself justify the
conclusion that it was not understood. Problems of this kind are
widespread throughout the developmental literature (see, e.g., Brainerd,
1973; Brown, in press; Kuhn, 1974).
Billow (1975) attempted to show that the development of genuine
comprehension of metaphor is related to the child's ability to deal with
formal operations, although acknowledging that some primitive form of
comprehension is in evidence even in 5-year-olds. Billow used children
ranging in age from 5 to 13 years old. He distinguished between two kinds
of metaphors, "similarity" metaphors and "proportional" metaphors. In
similarity metaphors, he argued, two disparate objects are compared on the
basis of a shared attribute, as in, for example, The branch of the tree was
her pony, where both the branch and the pony are ridden. In proportional
metaphors such as Summer's blood is in ripened blackberries, Billow argued
that "four or more elements...must be compared, not directly, but
proportionally" (p. 415). Thus, proportional metaphors are implicit
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analogies. Billow also looked at the children's ability to comprehend
proverbs. His results showed that where the similarity metaphors were
accompanied by pictures, 5-year-olds could explain the basis of the
metaphor about 30% of the time. However, the proportion correctly
explained was nearly 75% for 7-year-olds and almost perfect for 11-year-
olds. Billow also reported that "a stable use of concrete operations is
not a necessary condition for metaphor comprehension" (p. 419). With
respect to the "proportional metaphors" the results showed a high
correlation between the child's ability to explain the metaphor and the
development of formal operational thought. This part of the study was only
undertaken with children aged 9 through 13 for whom performance improved
from about 40% correctly explained to about 80% correctly explained.
However, the ability to engage in formal operations, though apparently
explaining performance on the proportional metaphors, failed to explain the
poor performance on the comprehension of proverbs. One should note that
the similarity metaphors, the proportional metaphors, and the proverbs were
substantially different with respect to difficulty on all kinds of
dimensions. It is clear, for example, that overall, the proverbs involved
more complicated syntactic constructions, a greater proportion of
relatively low-frequency words, and far more complicated demands on
knowledge of the world, be it physical, social, cultural, or proverbial
knowledge. The increase of comprehension with age may merely reflect a
greater probability of an already learned acquaintance with more-of the
proverbs. Similarly, the proportional metaphors were much more complex in
structure than the similarity metaphors, and they too involved more
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knowledge of various kinds. Indeed, the authors of the present review
found some of them very obscure. We are inclined to attribute the problem
to the stimulus materials rather than to the absence of our own formal
operations!
This study is noteworthy for its problems. Again we see the demand on
metacognitive skills; they are as likely to be age and stage related as is
the comprehension of figurative language itself. Again we see problems
with the underlying theory. How can ponies and branches literally share
the attribute of being ridden? The whole point of the metaphor is that the
branch is being ridden metaphorically. Finally, the results seem to allow
one to conclude little more than that more difficult linguistic/cognitive
tasks are performed better as children grow older.
Good empirical work on the development of metaphoric understanding
must control for preexisting knowledge. The failure to do this renders the
Billow study rather unrevealing, and it also turns out to be a problem for
an interesting study described by Winner, Rosensteil and Gardner (1976).
They hypothesized three levels of metaphoric understanding prior to mature
comprehension. The first level is the "magical" level, the second the
"metonymic," and the third they referred to as the "primitive metaphoric."
Each of these levels, they suggested, can be regarded as a stage in the
development toward the mature comprehension of metaphors. At the magical
stage the interpretation is made literal by the mental construction of a
suitable scenario. At the metonymic stage the terms in the metaphor are
taken to be somehow associated, and at the primitive stage true metaphoric
comprehension is partially present. For example, one of the items they
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presented was The prison guard was a hard rock. The magical interpretation
would be that the guard was (turned into) a rock. The metonymic one might
be that the guard worked in a prison with rock walls, and the primitive
metaphoric, that the guard was physically tough or hard. Children between
6 and 14 years of age were read the "stories" -- actually just context-
independent sentences -- and they either tried to explicate the meaning, or
they selected the meaning in a multiple-choice test. The results showed
that metonymic and primitive responses were predominant for 6-, 7-, and
8-year-olds. Genuine metaphoric responses were prevalent for 10-, 12-, and
14-year-olds. The younger children had fewer magical responses than
metonymic and primitive ones, but more than older children. These results
do suggest that older children are more likely to select or offer genuine
metaphoric interpretations than are younger children. The results do not,
however, establish that younger children cannot properly interpret
metaphors. In the multiple-choice condition, for example, there may have
been a response bias in favor of interpretations consistent with the kind
of stories children read -- young children are frequently exposed to
stories about magical worlds. Perhaps a more serious problem lies in the
fact that the stories were not really stories at all; they were isolated
sentences without contextual support. It is almost certainly the case that
the ability to deal with isolated sentences improves with age. Finally,
the explication task again makes demands on metacognitive skills. Such
approaches simply fail to give children a fair opportunity to demonstrate
their ability to comprehend metaphors if they have it. The real question
to be answered is, Can young children understand metaphors? To answer it,
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children must be given the maximum opportunity to do so, since their
relatively impoverished knowledge of the world, and of the conventions of
figurative language, may mislead them into selecting more familiar
interpretations.
Gardner (1974) conducted a study to determine whether or not the
ability to make metaphoric links could be found in preschool children.
Also attempted was an examination of the development of the ability to
comprehend metaphor. Gardner proposed that the ability to project "sets of
antonyms, or 'polar adjectives,' whose literal denotation within a domain
is known, onto a domain where they are not ordinarily employed" (p. 85)
could be considered a demonstration of the ability to comprehend metaphors.
The experimental procedure involved using five pairs of polar adjectives as
stimulus items to be mapped onto diverse domains. These items were
presented to 101 subjects at four ages levels. The mean age of subjects in
each of the groups was 3.5 years, 7 years, 11.5 years, and 19 years.
Subjects were given a set of stimulus words (e.g., cold-warm) and were told
to relate them to other adjective pairs, which encompassed five different
modalities (e.g., blue-red: Which color is cold and which is warm?). The
results showed a decrease in the number of errors made with increasing age
except for the two oldest groups. Preschoolers, however, averaged only
8.91 (of 25 possible) errors. Gardner noted that close analysis of the
data revealed several factors that seemed to contribute to the superior
performance found in older subjects. These factors included the knowledge
of physical laws, cultural conventions, a variety of connotative meanings
for words, and the ability to find abstract connecting terms.
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Gardner's conclusions were that preschool children can handle metaphors as
well as adults can, provided that the contents of the metaphors lie within
their experience. There is a problem with the study however. The relatively
good performance of even the young children might be a reflection of their
previous acquaintance with expressions like "red hot", or "blue with cold."
There is, therefore, a potential confounding between comprehending metaphors,
on the one hand, and responding to pre-established associations, on the
other.
Gentner (in press) compared children and adults on the basis of a task
rather different from those used in the studies cited so far. She supposed
that having children map facial features or body parts onto pictures of
objects (mountains, cars, and trees) would provide a test of metaphorical
ability, at least insofar as the latter had an analogical component. One of
her reasons for investigating the issue in this manner was that she wished to
avoid the kind of pitfalls that she noted had plagued the field. In the
experiment, subjects (20 children aged 4-5 1/2 years, and college sophomores)
were asked questions of the form, "If the mountain in the picture had a
nose, where would it be?" The results of the study indicated that the
children were as good at the task as were the adults. Gentner concluded
that her results "weaken the position that young children lack metaphorical
ability, and are compatible with the hypothesis that such ability is present
at the outset of language use." (p. )
A recent study by Honeck, Sowry, and Voegtle (in press) led the authors
to a similar conclusion. Like Gentner, they argued that previous research
had not satisfactorily demonstrated children's inability to handle
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figurative language because the task demands in most experiments have been
too complex. They argued that if less complex tasks were used, even young
children might demonstrate some understanding of figurative language. In
line with this reasoning, Honeck et al. developed a two-choice response
measure that was presented pictorially. In the study, children (7, 8, and 9
years old) were read 10 proverbs and were asked to select the picture that
meant the same thing as the sentence. On the basis of a strong tendency to
select the appropriate picture, they concluded that, contrary to other
evidence, "children age 7-9 are able to comprehend proverbs" (p. ).
Most of the research we have discussed so far seems to suggest that
although the ability to comprehend metaphors increases with age, there is
some rudimentary ability quite early on. We now move on to look at some more
naturalistic investigations into both production and comprehension of
metaphors. We also examine the effects of attempts to train children to
comprehend metaphors.
Grindstaff and Muller (1975) reviewed and summarized a national
assessment of response to literature. One aspect of this assessment
consisted of determining the ability of children to comprehend metaphors.
The data were obtained from individuals aged 9, 13, 17, and from adults.
Results indicated that comprehension of metaphors increased with age up to
age 17. Adult performance dropped off somewhat. This latter finding was
attributed to the effect of adults being out of school. Even though
comprehension increased with age, 45% of the 9-year-olds were able to
understand each metaphor. Sweet (1974) looked at the use of nonliteral
language development in writing in Grades 4-6. He took three kinds of
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samples from 81 subjects: a poem, a description, and a story. Scoring of the
samples was done in terms of the occurrence of alliteration, apostrophe,
hyperbole, irony, metaphor, personification, and simile. Sweet found that
more nonliteral language was found in the poems and the descriptions than in
the stories. No increase in usage was found between grades. As a final
analysis, Sweet had a panel of expert judges rate the quality of each of the
students' productions. He found that the judges tended to consider the use
of figurative language indicative of superior products. Because of this
result, Sweet suggested that instruction in the use of figurative language
should be built into composition curricula for Grades 4-6.
It is interesting to note that when formal instruction is attempted
there is evidence (Horne, 1966; Pollio & Pollio, 1974) that it is effective.
This seems to be true both for instruction in using figurative language and
for instruction in understanding it. Pollio and Pollio (1974) examined the
ability of third-sixth grade children to use figurative language. They also
compared two methods for increasing such usage: a commercial series of
instructional texts designed to increase figurative language production, and
a set of author-made lessons. Tasks of composition, elaborating comparisons
between objects, and generating multiple uses for objects were included as
the dependent variables. Results indicated that (a) children used
metaphorical language as early as third grade, (b) children used more dead
than novel metaphors in their composition and descriptions of multiple uses
for objects, (c) children used more novel than dead metaphors in making
comparisons, and (d) this pattern changed somewhat with grade, achievement
level, and socioeconomic status.
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Horne (1966) attempted to teach sixth graders how to comprehend figures
of speech. He presented 73 sixth graders with 24 work sessions spread over 7
months. The sessions were designed to increase comprehension of the
analogical nature of figurative language and to increase the production of
such language in the children's writing. The experimental group performed
significantly better than an untrained control group on the comprehension of,
but not on the use of figurative language. Age, sex, and socioeconomic
status were not correlated with either comprehension or use of metaphor.
Scores on standardized intelligence tests were related to comprehension but
not to use. This study demonstrated that children can be taught to increase
their comprehension of metaphor.
The studies by Gentner (in press) and Horne (1966) seem to presuppose
that analogical reasoning underlies the comprehension of figurative
language. Research by Khatena (1973) and Levinson and Carpenter (1974) was
explicitly concerned with investigating the development of analogical
reasoning. Khatena (1973) examined the ability of children and young adults
between the ages of 8 and 19 to produce analogies in response to a request to
do so, given single word stimuli. Two-hundred eighty-four "high-creative"
subjects were selected for the task, namely those subjects with high scores
on an independent test Khatena had developed called "Onomatopoeia and
Images." Khatena classified the analogies he elicited into four categories;
personal, direct, symbolic, and fantasy, based on Gordon (1961). Personal
analogies were identified as attempts by the subjects to compare themselves
to an object (e.g., I'm happy as a lark). Direct analogies were defined as
direct comparisons between objects (e.g., comparing a woman's body to summer
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in the phrase, But they eternal summer shall not fade). Symbolic analogies
compared symbolic representations of objects, rather than the objects
themselves (e.g., sharks tearing at a marlin to represent critics analyzing a
writer). Finally, fantasy analogies were characterized as those in which a
comparison involved an imaginary or magical phenomenon (e.g., Satan). Each
analogy was also classified as either simple or complex. Of a total of 4,960
analogies, 83.6% were direct comparisons; of these 81.2% were simple.
Although the ability to produce complex analogies did increase with age,
Khatena concluded from these findings that relatively young children can
produce creative analogies and that creativity can perhaps be taught by
instructing people to use simple, direct analogies. Unfortunately, it is not
at all clear that these conclusions follow from the results of Khatena's
study. Genuine analogies involve four terms: the fact that an individual
produces a phrase like I'm happy as a lark in response to a word such as
delight does not warrant any strong conclusion about analogical reasoning.
Neither the study itself, nor the report of it could be regarded as
exemplary.
Levinson and Carpenter (1974) considered the ability of 42 children,
aged 9, 12, and 15, to complete quasi and true analogies. True analogies
were structures such as "Birds are to air as fish are to _,"
whereas the corresponding quasi-analogy would be "Birds use air, fish use
." Thus, quasi-analogies specified the relationships involved,
and true analogies did not. The results showed that 9-year-olds did
significantly better on the quasi-analogies than on the true analogies but
were still able to complete 50% of the true analogies (8 of 16). Both the
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12- and 15-year-olds performed the same on the quasi and true analogies and
were significantly better than the 9-year-olds in both cases. The ability to
give reasons for the choices made on the analogies increased with age. The
implications of Levinson and Carpenter's study are threefold. First,
9-year-olds can use analogies, and the ability to do so increases with age,
although performance is fairly stable between ages 12 and 15. Second, the
ability to explain choices improves with age. Third, perhaps quasi-analogies
can be used to increase skill in true analogies.
Summary. Developmental research into the comprehension of metaphor
seems to be plagued with many and difficult problems. These problems tend to
be shared, and include such things as inadequate control over preexisting
knowledge, inadequate control over difficulty of materials, overreliance on
metacognitive/linguistic skills, and utilization of experimental tasks not
clearly related to the comprehension of metaphor. There also seems to be an
excessive concern with metaphorical uses of words, perhaps because
researchers have relied on a working definition of metaphor as a word or
phrase used to denote something that is not its ordinary referent. As will
be discussed below, this is too restrictive a definition.
It is interesting that children can be taught to improve their
comprehension of nonliteral uses of language, and it is also interesting that
they appear to have reasonable analogical skills at an early age. The
possibility therefore exists that the decrements in performance for young
children could be largely accounted for by a paucity of relevant experience
of the world and of the use of metaphors, rather than by the constraining
influences of cognitive development. A greater emphasis on determining
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whether there are any conditions under which young children do comprehend
metaphors, and if so, what those conditions are, is needed.
In defense of those who have been working in the field, it should be
noted that the area is very difficult to investigate and many of the problems
appear, at least at first sight, to be inherent in the nature of the field.
Literal controls are often difficult if not impossible to generate,
especially if the emphasis is on investigating metaphoric uses of individual
words.
Finally, in looking at the production of metaphors and the results of
training, care has to be taken in judging what is and what is not true
metaphor. Matter and Davis (1975) addressed this problem in their discussion
of the developmental research done on metaphor:
In early stages of language acquisition children produce categorical
errors and mistakes that can be taken as metaphorical expression but are
not. The child is in the process of learning to recognize and correct
perceptual, cognitive, and conceptual "error."...As these "errors" are
corrected, children develop a highly literal linguistic behavior. In
this intermediate stage, children are getting their categories
straight....Fol lowing the literal stage, children again enter the world
of category mistakes intentional ly...they discover metaphor. (p. 75)
While we do not necessarily agree with this statement in its entirety, it is
important insofar as it draws attention to the fact that not all literally
inappropriate uses of language are, ipso facto, metaphorical uses: Some
children's productions may very well be metaphors, but others may just be
Metaphor
31
reflections of misconceptions. In short, the expressions scored as
metaphorical in some of the research cited above might simply be the efforts
of a child making a "perceptual, cognitive, or conceptual 'error.'" This
cautionary note is also important for research on older subjects. Research
With Mature Language Users
Serious empirical investigations into the comprehension of metaphors by
adults have been much less widespread than developmental research.
Koen (1965) suggested a psycholinguistic orientation to the study of
metaphor. A prerequisite of this orientation is the assumption that literal
terms and metaphors can be connected by common verbal associations in a
semantic interface. (The interface contains associations common to both the
literal and metaphorical terms.) Differences between metaphorical and
literal meanings of the same word are characterized by different sets of
unique associations. Koen predicted that metaphorical meanings could be
derived from literal meaning through a search for common, linking
associations. He tested this hypothesis by having subjects view sentences
like The sandpiper ran along the beach leaving a row of tiny stitches/marks
in the sand. In accordance with the verbal associative hypothesis, Koen made
three specific predictions: (a) Cue words originally generated from the
metaphoric terms should most often elicit the choice of the metaphoric terms,
(b) cues words associated more frequently with the literal term should
promote the choice of that term, and (c) interfaced associations should cue
both terms equally well. The results mirrored these predictions exactly, but
as with so many of the developmental studies, this study suffers from a weak
connection between the experimental task and the comprehension of metaphor.
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Indeed, it seems to reduce to a demonstration that highly associated words
tend to be good cues for one another. Furthermore, the verbal associative
argument itself is not well developed. Complex metaphors with many different
facets would not be easily handled by it, although to some extent, this
criticism is a general problem for laboratory investigations into the
comprehension of metaphor. Finally, Paivio (1971) has suggested that an
imageability interpretation could be made of the data. The cue words might
simply be arousing images of the choice words, thereby facilitating their
selection.
Some of the best studies carried out with either adults or children are
those reported by Verbrugge and McCarrell (1977). They took the position
that metaphors are comparisons that are comprehended when the unexpressed
ground between the topic and the vehicle is inferred. Verbrugge and
McCarrell noted that if this assumption is true, the principle of encoding
specificity (Thompson and Tulving, 1971) would necessitate that the ground be
an effective recall cue. To test this hypothesis two lists of 14 metaphors
and similes were prepared. An example of one of the items is, Billboards are
warts on the landscape. Here billboards is the topic, warts the vehicle, and
the ground is something like, an ugly protrusion on the surface. The topics
for each list were held constant while the vehicles (and hence the grounds)
were a lowed to vary. For example, List A might compare billboards to warts
and List B, billboards to yellow pages on a highway. The experimental lists
were presented to subjects (via tape recorder) with instructions to think
about and understand the sentences. After completion of the list
presentation, subjects received booklets containing the written prompts and
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were asked to respond to each by writing the appropriate original sentence.
The prompts were the grounds (relevant and irrelevant), topics, and vehicles
from the presented sentences. The results showed that topics and vehicles
prompted the highest recall with relevant grounds close behind. The
irrelevant grounds were significantly less effective than the other three
prompts. Clearly, the most important finding was the high level of recall
for the relevant grounds (10 of 14 sentences), which seems to suggest that
subjects do indeed infer the implicit ground of a metaphor when they attempt
to understand it.
Before accepting this explanation, Verbrugge and McCarrell noted that
several other explanations could be applied equally well to their results.
Simply stated these other explanations are: (a) The relevant grounds are
predicates or features of the topic which could have been available to the
reader at acquisition, and therefore would be effective recall prompts even
if they were not encoded as part of the inferred ground. Consequently, the
finding that relevant grounds are good recall cues does not necessitate that
the relevant ground was inferred. (b) The relevant grounds are predicates or
features of the vehicle and therefore, for the same reasons, would be good
recall cues. (c) The relevant grounds are high associates of the topic and
the vehicle and therefore would be effective prompts for the target sentence
event if the subjects had not previously seen the sentence. This last
hypothesis is not unlike the one suggested by Koen (1965) that was discussed
above. Using experimental materials and procedures similar to those already
described, Verbrugge and McCarrell reported three further experiments which
dealt with and discarded each of the suggested hypotheses.
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Results indicated that neither the topic nor the vehicle alone can be
viewed as the dominant, meaning-giving component of a metaphor. The two must
interact to produce the relevant ground. The exact nature of this
interaction was not explained, but Verbrugge and McCarrell stated that they
had found, "...several indications that the vehicle plays the major role in
guiding the comprehender toward a resemblance. Schemata in the vehicle
domain tend to be the predominant source of constraints by which the topic
domain is interpreted." (p. 52) They were also able to conclude that a
simple associative view is not sufficient to account for the interpretation
of meaningful metaphors.
In summary, Verbrugge and McCarrell drew three main conclusions from
their research. First, the comprehension of metaphors is both easy and
consistent for adults. Second, the comprehension of metaphors involves
inferring an implicit comparison between the topic and the vehicle. Finally,
when a metaphor is comprehended, attention is directed to some aspects of the
topic at the expense of others. Verbrugge and McCarrell raise several.
theoretical questions that they make no attempt to answer, but there is
little doubt that the quality of their research is unusually high.
Although the next studies to be discussed did not deal specifically with
metaphor, they were concerned with related subjects. A discussion of them is
relevant to the more general functioning of figurative language. Bock and
Brewer (Note 2) described a study concerned with the literal and figurative
interpretations of proverbs. Their primary purpose was to demonstrate that
subjects process at the literal and figurative levels, proverbs and that
using a procedure designed to enhance figurative comprehension would greatly
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improve the level of figurative recognition.
The experimental materials were composed of proverb sets containing a
proverb, four manipulations of it, and a control. Specifically, each set
contained (a) the OP, (b) a paraphrase of the OP that maintained its literal
meaning, (c) a paraphrase that was an incorrect literal statement of the OP,
(d) a paraphrase that was a statement of the figurative meaning of the OP,
(e) an incorrect paraphrase of the figurative meaning of the OP, and (f) a
control proverb with both figural and literal differences from the OP.
Twenty different proverb sets of this form were developed. The manipulation
consisted of two treatments. Subjects were presented with one of the several
proverb lists and were given a two-alternative forced-choice recognition
test. Another group of subjects received a similar proverb list but took a
figural-comprehension test after each presentation (again, a two-alternative
forced-choice test). These subjects then received a recognition test like
that given to subjects in the first group. The results of the experiment
suggested three main outcomes. First, improved comprehension of the figural
meaning at acquisition (deep-comprehension condition) led to increased
recognition of figural meaning on the criterion test. Second, at the time of
the recognition test (5 min. after lists were presented) subjects showed good
memory for the original syntactic structure, lexical information, literal
meanings, and figural meanings. Bock and Brewer suggested that this
illustrates the weakness of associative models such as (J. Anderson & Bower,
1973), which treat only one level of processing. Third, contrary to other
findings (Sachs, 1967), subjects in this study demonstrated extremely good
memory for items at all levels of processing, including surface structure.
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It could be, however, that the two-choice testing procedure created this last
result. This study seems to illuminate some interesting possibilities for
research with metaphor. Since good memory was exhibited for both literal and
figurative meanings, a reconstructive approach to metaphor might be feasible.
That is to say, the figurative meaning of some metaphorical communication
could be constructed at recall as well as at acquisition. The results
suggest that if procedures are used that require the comprehension of a
figurative level of meaning, memory for the figural maning will be quite
good. It should be noted, however, that in Bock and Brewer's deep-
comprehension task, subjects actually received two exposures to the correct
figurative interpretation. This might account for the high figural-
recognition scores just as well as the deeper-processing hypothesis does.
Osborn and Ehninger (cited in Reinsch, 1971) examined the functions of
metaphor in rhetorical discourse. On the basis of an informal, subjective
evaluation they concluded that the metaphorical process was characterized by
three mental events: error, puzzlement-recoil, and resolution. Error was
thought to encompass the hearer's initial unsuccessful attempt to understand
the metaphorical statement literally. Puzzlement-recoil describes the
cognitive difficulty (dissonance?) that follows error and leads to the
rejection of the literal interpretation. Resolution suggests the mental
discovery of similarities between the topic and the vehicle of the metaphor.
The Osborn and Ehninger paradigm seems to suggest rather naturally the
approach recently taken by Brewer, Harris, and Brewer (Note 3).
Using proverbs again, Brewer et al. postulated that unfamiliar proverbs
are understood in two sequentially ordered steps. The notion is that on
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encountering a proverb, one first attempts to comprehend the literal meaning,
and only after that is accomplished is the figural meaning processed.
Fifty-six proverb sets were constructed, each containing a proverb and the
same 4 manipulations of it used in Bock and Brewer (Note 2). The subjects
were instructed to read and understand two sentence (selected from the
manipulations) and to determine if they had the same or different meanings.
Experimental pairs were constructed by randomly combining OPs and their
paraphrases. Half the time the OP was presented first, and half the time,
second. It was found that it took subjects longer to understand the figural
meaning when the OP was presented second, but not when it was presented
first. This interaction was expected because when the OP was presented
first, both figural and literal meanings were available to the subject. When
the OP was presented second, the figural meaning had to be comprehended from
the literal meaning. These results seem to support the hypothesis that
comprehension of the literal level of meaning precedes the comprehension of
the figural level. Brewer et al. concluded that since both metaphors and
proverbs have figural and literal components, this finding should generalize
to the more global case of metaphor.
Summary. Research into the comprehension of nonliteral uses of language
done with adults has yielded only slightly more information than that done
with children. The Verbrugge and McCarrell (1977) experiments do seem to
reveal an interesting quality of metaphors. The fact that the inferred
ground of a metaphorical relationship acts as a good recall cue seems to
indicate that some additional inferential processing is done when a metaphor
is comprehended. The nature or depth of this processing, however, is not
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revealed. The research of Brewer and his associates (Bock & Brewer, Note 2;
Brewer et al., Note 3) suggests that processing nonliteral uses of language
involves processing the literal meaning first, although as will be discussed
later, evidence to the contrary has been found by Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds
and Antos (in press).
The adult research is scanty but promising. Many questions remain to be
answered, perhaps the most important of which is: What is the relationship
between the literal and nonliteral meaning? The box has been opened, but the
contents have yet to be examined.
The Prognosis for Research
Traditionally, the study of metaphor has been predominantly undertaken
by scholars of philosophy and literature; it has been slow to find its way
into psychology. Yet, an understanding of metaphor, the processes underlying
its comprehension, and the communicative functions it serves is not only an
interesting and provocative area in cognitive psychology and
psycholinguistics, but it also has important implications for educational
psychology. The first part of this section is devoted to a discussion of the
relevance of research in the area of metaphor with respect to its
relationship to theories of language comprehension. Its implications for
educational psychology will be discussed in the second part of the section.
The Relevance of Metaphor for Psychological Theory
During the last few years cognitive psychology has seen a surge of
interest in models of semantic memory and language comprehension, but it
seems that few theorists who have worked in this area have considered
metaphor sufficiently important to warrant their attention. Kintsch (1972,
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1974) and, to some extent, Collins and Quillian (1972) might be regarded as
exceptions to this generalization, but still, although they acknowledged the
problem, they had relatively little to say about it. Rumelhart and Ortony
(1977) discussed the way in which schema theory might handle the
comprehension of metaphor, but again the discussion was peripheral to their
main concerns. Yet metaphors are not freak occurrences disturbing the
otherwise smooth flow of ordinary literal language use, rather, they are
widespread in the everyday language that people encounter. Consequently, we
are of the opinion that any psycholinguistic theory that does not handle
metaphor is incomplete, and any that cannot is inadequate. Admittedly, an
account of the way in which people understand nonliteral uses of language is
a fairly heavy demand to place upon a theory of language comprehension
(indeed, it might be objected that it is an unfairly heavy demand!), but it
is probably a crucial test. Different theoretical notions about language
comprehension are likely to lead to different predictions about the
comprehension of metaphors. However, it seems to be necessary to extend
theoretical positions beyond their current form to make any such predictions
at all.
In terms of the robustness of the models that psychologists have
proposed for the way in which people understand language and the way in which
they store the results of that understanding, metaphor could pose some quite
serious problems. For example, propositional models, which are characterized
by the representation of all knowledge and comprehended sentences as
propositions (e.g., J. Anderson & Bower, 1973; Kintsch, 1974), seem to be
forced to treat metaphors as semantic anomalies. Propositional theories seem
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to be hampered by their reliance on too rigid a notion of word meaning (see,
e.g., R. C. Anderson & Ortony, 1975), and this constraint is likely to lead
to an overly hasty characterization of input sentences as semantically
anomalous. The representation of word meanings in such models simply fails
to permit the kind of flexibility that would be required to make sense of a
metaphor. In any event, models of this type, were they to attempt to make
sense of metaphors, would appear to require a two-stage process. The first
stage would involve an attempt to impose a literal meaning on the input
sentence, which presumably would fail. The second stage would involve an
attempt to recover from the error.
Several instances of stage models have in fact been proposed. Kintsch
(1974) proposed one for the comprehension of metaphors, Brewer and his
collaborators proposed one for proverbs, and Clark and Lucy (1975) proposed
one for the comprehension of indirect requests. Kintsch (1974) supposed that
all metaphors are necessarily semantically anomalous. He proposed that a
metaphor would be recognized as an anomalous input string and would therefore
be converted into an explicit comparison. As Kintsch himself observed, this
mechanism suffers from an inability to distinguish metaphors from
uninterpretable nonsense and irrelevant falsehoods. Furthermore, it is by no
means clear that every metaphor can be readily converted into an explicit
comparison.
The model tested by Clark and Lucy'(1975) lends itself fairly readily to
application to the comprehension of metaphors. Indeed, such a model has been
proposed as a quite general one for the comprehension of language that
superficial ly fails to cohere with the surrounding context. This proposal was
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made, most notably, by Grice (1975), who argued that linguistic interactions
are governed by an implicit convention, the Cooperative Principle, whereby
utterances are normally sincere, relevant, appropriately precise, and clear.
Grice cast these expectations as maxims and proposed that sometimes one or
more of the maxims might appear to be violated, but that in reality they
rarely are. Apparent violations are resolved by a hearer through a variety
of inferential strategies. Searle (Note 4), working in the same paradigm as
Grice, addressed the problem of metaphor explicitly. He argued that the
comprehension of metaphors involved the hearer determining the utterance
meaning from the sentence meaning, given that the latter is judged to be
defective. He argued that the difference between an indirect speech act
(such as Clark and Lucy investigated) and a metaphor is that in the former
the speaker means both the literal meaning and the conveyed meaning, whereas
in the latter, only the conveyed meaning is intended. Searle's treatment
requires that the hearer determine that the sentence meaning is defective.
Consequently, the hearer must process the kiteral meaning of the sentence
first so that this determination can be made. Then, when the hearer fails to
comprehend the sentence in the context, it becomes necessary to seek some
alternative meaning, presumably on the basis of the literal meaning. Both
the proposal of Kintsch, and that implied by Verbrugge and McCarrell (1977),
could be regarded as potential accounts of how this reinterpretation stage is
achieved.
The account offered by Verbrugge and McCarrell lacks some of the
pitfalls of the one offered by Kintsch, perhaps because it is not dependent
on an underlying propositional model of comprehension and memory. Their
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position seems more compatible with the kind of knowledge representations
advocated by schema theorists (see, e.g., Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart & Ortony,
1977; Schank & Abelson, 1975). At least in some versions of this approach,
knowledge is represented in a more flexible manner than in propositional
models. In propositional models, word meanings are represented as
propositions about the core meaning, but in schema theory what gets
represented is knowledge associated with the things to which the words refer.
Thus, what a schema contains is not so much information about what is
necessarily the case, but information about what is usually or normally the
case. For example, in a propositional model the meaning of a word like cow
is pretty much exhausted, in the best Aristotelian tradition, by a statement
of its species and differentia. A cow is a mature female of cattle. In
contrast, the schema for cow would include a great deal of information people
have about cows: that they are domesticated, provide milk, and so forth.
The structure of a schema is of a series of variables together with
relationships among them. There are constraints on the values that the
variables may take, but these constraints are rarely absolute, although some
values are more typical than others. This kind of representational system
appears to offer greater flexibility for matching incoming information to
previously stored knowledge, and with this flexibility comes a better
prospect for dealing with nonliteral uses of language. The metaphorical
interpretation would be achieved by finding that schema or those schemata
which matched the input in such a way as to minimize the required changes in
variable ranges.
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So, if one is permitted sufficiently liberal speculations, one can be
led to suppose that propositional models and schema theoretic models will
make different predictions about the comprehension of metaphor. In
particular, propositional models appear to be forced to specify special
processes for the comprehension of metaphor, whereas schema based models
perhaps need not. This is because propositional models seem likely to treat
metaphors as anomalies whose recognition invokes reinterpretation procedures.
Schema based models usually operate on finding the best possible account of
an input, so that a metaphor may merely result in the same process finding a
less complete account than it does for literal language (see, for example,
Rumelhart, Note 5).
It might be argued that there is yet another class of theories that
makes different predictions about the comprehension of metaphor. The
theories in question are not really incompatible with propositional or schema
theories. We refer to the so-called network theories (e.g., Collins &
Quillian, 1969, 1972; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Quillian, 1968). Network
theories are more process-oriented than structure oriented. They say nothing
about the internal structure of the concepts that constitute the nodes of a
semantic network. Rather, they concentrate on the consequences of a spreading
activation mechanism for moving about within such a network. If some of the
nodes represent propositions, then a propositional model can utilize such a
mechanism, and if the nodes represent schemata, then a schema theoretic
approach can utilize it (see, e.g., Ortony, 1978, in press). The basis of
the spreading activation process is the notion of an intersection, namely, a
node that is connected to and, consequently activated by two or more of the
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concepts in the input string. An intersection has to be semantically close to
the originating nodes so as to avoid every node in the network being an
intersection of every set of originating nodes. Why should such a mechanism
not be admirably suited to the comprehension of metaphors, as was implicitly
supposed by Koen (1965)? Can the ground not be automatically determined by
finding an intersection from the topic and the vehicle? The incompatible
aspects of the two, namely the basis for the metaphoric tension, would be
bypassed and only the ground of the metaphor would be accessed. It may well
be that such a process plays a role by suggesting candidate schemata, but it
cannot possibly be a sufficient account of the processing of metaphors. There
are several reasons for this, but perhaps the most telling is the fact that
it would fail to account for the asymmetrical nature of metaphors. Using
Verbrugge and McCarrell's (1977) example of Billboards are warts on the
landscape again, one observes that it means something entirely different from
Warts are billboards on the landscape, yet a spreading activation mechanism
would almost certainly result in the same intersection for both, even though
the grounds of the two metaphors are rather different. So, the predictions
made by network models alone are counterintuitive. The predictions that it
makes in conjunction with a propositional or schema theoretic model will
depend on exactly how the two are put together.
The manner in which competing theories deal with the comprehension of
metaphors seems to constitute a challenge to the to the goodness of those
theories, but such a challenge cannot be taken up until there exists a
coherent and reliable body of knowledge about human performance on metaphoric
comprehension. We have suggested that such a body of knowledge does not yet
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exist and that the generation of one is a worthwhile enterprise.
If the study of metaphor is important in cognitive psychology, it is no
less important in educational psychology. The most obvious reason for this is
that a major concern in educational psychology is with the processes
underlying the acquisition of knowledge. Since so much of what people learn
is learned through the medium of language, and since metaphors are so
prevalent in language, it follows that knowing how metaphors are processed
and what constraints exist on their comprehension is bound to contribute to
our understanding of the learning process. However, there are more profound
ways in which metaphor is of concern in educational psychology, reasons
concerned with pedagogy and radical conceptual change. In discussing the
role of metaphors in education, it is necessary to broaden our notion of
metaphor. For although metaphors occur in instructional materials and in
instructional dialogue at the level of individual sentences, the really
crucial role they play is in systems. We might call them extended metaphors,
or analogies, or even models.
It is common sense that it is easier to understand new things if they
are cast in terms of old. In the field of developmental psycholinguistics
this fact has been expressed by Slobin (1971) in terms of the principle, "New
forms first express old functions, and new functions are first expressed by
old forms" (p. 317). Apart from the fact that this principle in itself is
consistent with the generation of metaphors by children, it seems to be a
general principle of learning. It follows that the manifestation of the
principle will occur through a process which in some way compares, explicitly
or implicitly, the old function served by the old form and the new function
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served by it. One of the ways in which such comparative relationships can be
drawn out is by the use of metaphors, similes, analogies, and models.
It would be a mistake to restrict one's concern with the role of
metaphors in learning to the learning of subject matter. There are more
global educational processes in which metaphor plays an important role.
Petrie (1976) discussed these issues when he talked about problems of
interdisciplinary work, particularly in the context of the problems posed by
the fact that different disciplinary orientations give rise to different ways
of perceiving the same phenomena. Petrie claimed that the reason for this is
that different disciplines presuppose different cognitive maps, by which he
meant
the whole paradigmatic and perceptual apparatus used by any given
discipline. This includes, but is not limited to, basic concepts, modes
of inquiry, problem definition, observational categories, representation
techniques, standards of proof, types of explanation, and general ideas
of what constitutes a discipline. (p. 11)
He argued persuasively that the key pedagogical tool for bridging
disciplinary gaps is metaphor, conceived of in the same broad way in which we
do here.
We are of the opinion that there are very good reasons for investigating
metaphors from a psychological point of view. It is too important an area in
both cognitive psychology and educational psychology to leave to the a priori
ruminations of philosophers. Such efforts have not only failed to come up
with a satisfactory account of what a metaphor is, they are also quite
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sterile so far as accumulating empirical data is concerned. One shortcoming
of almost all I the research that we have cited is that the locus of a metaphor
is assumed to lie in a word, or perhaps an expression, within a sentence. If
research is to progress it will be necessary to adopt a less restrictive
account of what a metaphor is. It is our hope that this review can make a
positive contribution by proposing such an account, which, if adopted might
have some immediate implications for the conduct of empirical research. An
Approach to the Study of Metaphor
The general questions that need to be answered concern when and why
people use metaphors, when and how they understand them, and how the
processes presumed to underlie their use and comprehension relate to those
involved in the comprehension of literal uses of language. It is our
contention that the answers to these questions will not be forthcoming if one
characterizes metaphors by attempting to diagnose peculiarities in the
surface structure of an utterance. As discussed above, for example, the
characterization of metaphors as semantic anomalies is accompanied by severe
theoretical problems. It simply is not the case that all metaphors are
semantically anomalous, so semantic anomaly cannot be a necessary condition
for something to be a metaphor. Indeed, one of the most compelling facts
about metaphors is that many are semantically perfectly well-formed. It is
also one of the most widely ignored facts. Consider, for example, the final
sentence of the Summary section above, The box has been opened, but the
contents have yet to be examined. This is a perfectly normal English
sentence, it is syntactically and semantically unremarkable. Yet it occurred
in a context that required it to be interpreted metaphorically. In other
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words, that sentence in that context was a metaphor. Of course, most
contexts in which that sentence would be used would be contexts inducing a
literal interpretation. Consider another example:
1. Regardless of the danger the troops marched on.
Again, this is a perfectly ordinary sentence which, in the context of an army
marching to battle would normally receive a literal interpretation, but in
other contexts it may have to be interpreted metaphorically, as in the
context 2:
2. The children had been annoying their teacher all morning and she was
becoming increasingly irritated by their unruly behavior. She
simply did not know how to stop them from climbing on the chairs
and tables and throwing all manner of objects about the room. She
decided to threaten to punish every one of them if they did not
stop. As loud as she could she shouted her warning. She would make
them all stand outside in the rain. Regardless of the danger the
troops marched on.
In the context of the ineffectual school teacher and her problem Sentence 1
is a metaphor. Definitions of metaphor that concentrate on words or phrases
in sentences are going to have difficulty accounting for the metaphorical use
of an entire sentence as opposed to a word or phrase within a sentence. Such
definitions are common in dictionaries, and they appear to be the working
definitions that have been presupposed in most of the empirical research that
has been undertaken. The examples just given are not cases of a word or
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phrase being applied to something it does not usually denote because none of
the substantive words denote their usual objects or concepts. Thus, in
Sentence 1 standing in the rain is hardly a danger, there are no real troops,
and there is no real marching. Perhaps the metaphor is not be a very good
metaphor, but that is beside the point. What matters is that we recognize it
as a metaphor, as a whole-sentence metaphor, not a part-sentence metaphor.
What makes the sentence a metaphor is not any characteristic of its surface
structure, but the context. The fact that entire sentences can be metaphors
has not been totally overlooked. It is implicit in Perrine's (1971) four
categories of metaphor since in one of them the topic is implicit as it is in
Sentence 1. While Perrine did not explicitly deny that semantic anomaly was a
necessary condition for metaphor, there are linguists who have strenuously
denied it, as have, for example, Reddy (1969) and Van Dijk (1975).
It is now possible to assert that any definition of metaphor must
encompass not only part-sentence metaphors but whole-sentence metaphors as
well. One way to achieve this end is to require that a metaphor be
pragmatically, or contextually anomalous, rather than semantically anomalous.
This is to say that literally interpreted the sentence must be incongruous in
the context in which it appears. Since semantically anomalous sentences are
incongruous in all contexts if they are interpreted literally, part-sentence
metaphors are automatically included.
All metaphorical uses, be they of words, phrases, sentences, or even
larger linguistic units, must have their metaphorical meaning characterized
in terms of their literal meaning. In Sentence 1 the metaphorical meaning is
related to certain components of its literal meaning. So, the metaphorical
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meaning of Sentence 1 in the context of 2 will be those contextually relevant
salient components of its literal meaning that do not conflict with the
context. For example, one implication of the literal meaning of Sentence 1
is that a group of people continued doing what they were already doing
without concern for the consequences. Another is that these consequences
were undesirable, and another, that the people were aware of this but were
stubbornly unconcerned, and so on.
The selection of salient aspects of the literal meaning of a metaphor
that are not incompatible with the context was referred to as a process of
tension elimination by Ortony (1975). In the case of a metaphor such as
Sentence 1 in Context 2, the tension is caused by the incompatibility of the
literal interpretation of Sentence 1 and the context in which it occurs. The
notion of metaphoric tension is just as applicable to semantically well-
formed sentences such as Sentence 1 as it is to semantically anomalous
sentences such as Sentence 3, which constituted the prototypical metaphor for
early research.
3. The ship plowed the seas.
In both Sentences 1 and 3, comprehension seems to require the elimination of
aspects of the meaning of expressions that when interpreted literally give
rise to tension.
Perhaps we should now try to reformulate a definition of metaphor. A
first condition for something being a metaphor appears to be that it is
contextually anomalous. This means that if it is interpreted literally, it
fails to fit the context. This allows Sentence 1 to be a metaphor in Context
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2 but prevents it from being one in those cases in which it is literally
interpretable. Consequently, a metaphor is not a sentence, but a token of a
sentence or an utterance. The contextual-anomaly condition also allows us to
include Sentence 3. Part sentence metaphors, such as Sentence 3, are
semantically anomalous, and if interpreted literally, semantically anomalous
sentences are nearly always also contextually anomalous. The contextual-
anomaly condition is a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient for it
fails to exclude cases such as Sentence 4, which are unresolvable semantic
anomalies:
4. Regardless of the wavelength, some anger programmed the bus
sandwich.
It might be argued that in some possible context, Sentence 4 could be used
metaphorically or even literally, and if this is indeed true, one would not
want to exclude it. But for the sake of argument, let us suppose that it is
an unresolvable semantic anomaly. This suggests a second condition, namely,
that for something to be a metaphor, it must be possible, in principle, to
eliminate the tension. Taken together, these two conditions are are
necessary and sufficient for a linguistic expression to be a metaphor. The
expression should be contextually anomalous, and the metaphorical tension
must in principle be eliminable. These conditions ought probably to be
elaborated in terms of the speaker's intentions. One might, for example,
claim that for a speaker to intend to utter something metaphorically, he must
believe that both conditions hold. If he doesn't, he still might produce a
metaphor, but by accident. It would be an accident in the sense that a
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hearer might wrongly attribute to the speaker certain intentions he never
had; consequently, communication might break down.
The definition of metaphor that has been offered has some attractive
features when employed in empirical research, but before discussing these it
is important to emphasize that it is only a definition. The definition does
not itself entail anything about processing mechanisms, and in particular, it
does not follow from the definition that metaphors are understood by first
recognizing the contextual anomaly and then resolving the metaphoric tension.
A simple example should make this clear. One of the most concise definitions
of the factorial function (!) is a recursive one: for any integer greater
than 1, n! = n x (n-l)!. It does not follow from this definition, however,
that people compute factorials by using recursion. The definition serves to
delimit instances of the phenomenon, and that is all. The reason we have
offered a definition is that we believe that the phenomenon of metaphor is
not, typically, properly delimited.
If metaphor is defined as tension resolvable contextual anomaly, where
tension resolution can be independently characterized, (see, Ortony 1975), it
becomes possible to conduct empirical research that is free of many of the
difficulties that seem to be so widespread in the literature. One can
investigate the comprehension of metaphors with a variety of dependent
measures, while controlling for surface structure characteristics. This can
be done by comparing performance using a target item when its preceding
context induces a literal interpretation with performance using the same
target when the context induces a metaphoric interpretation. One can also
control for meaning, since it is much easier to generate a literal paraphrase
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of a whole-sentence metaphor than it is of a part-sentence metaphor.
(Compare the ease of generating a literal equivalent of Sentence 1 as opposed
to Sentence 3.) Whether or not whole-sentence metaphors are easier or more
difficult to understand than part-sentence metaphors is a question that
cannot yet be answered. But our feeling is that much more can be learned
using whole-sentence paradigms and that that is the place to start.
If the definition of metaphor just proposed is accepted, interesting
implications follow for the relationship between metaphors and comparisons.
As our review has shown, many theorists believe that metaphors are (intended
to suggest) comparisons. The account that we have given suggests that the
role of comparison is in the tension-elimination process itself. Undoubtedly
some metaphors are intended by their authors to focus on comparative aspects,
but others may be vehicles for understanding things in new ways or for
expressing what is literally inexpressible. In such cases comparison may be
better regarded as the means of comprehension rather that the purpose of it.
In any event, invoking comparison to explain metaphor has its own problems.
For one must distinguish between literal comparisons and nonliteral
comparisons.
Assume that someone utters Sentence 5 with a view to asserting that
encyclopaedias are of great (intellectual) value.
5. Encyclopaedias are goldmines.
The futility of the comparison theory of metaphor as a basis for a
psychological explanation of the comprehension process can be seen by
considering the fact that the comparison theory entails that Sentence 5 means
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the same as Sentence 6.
6. Encyclopaedias are like goldmines.
In a word, the problem is that they are not! Encyclopaedias are like
dictionaries, not goldmines. People are very willing to agree that
encyclopaedias are like dictionaries, but if asked whether they are like
goldmines, they respond "not really", or "sort of". In other words,
encyclopaedias are only like goldmines metaphorically. So, the explicit
statement of comparison that is supposed to underlie the metaphor is itself
metaphorical in nature. Thus, the comparison theory explains nothing about
metaphor, since the problems all reappear in the comparisons. What would be
needed for the comparison theory to work is a theory of similarity that could
distinguish between literal and nonliteral similarity statements. Ortony
(Note 6, Note 7) outlines the nature of such a theory starting from the
theory of similarity proposed by Tversky (1977). This observation has one
other consequence. Just as it is fruitless to attempt to reduce some
metaphors to statements of comparison, so too is it fruitless to try to
reduce others to analogies. For what is an analogy if not a statement of
similarity between relations? This being the case, some analogies will be
literal and others non-literal. All this means is that metaphors cannot be
explained away by appeal to comparisons. It does not mean that comparisons
are not heavily implicated in the comprehension process.
Conclusion
We have reviewed traditional theories of metaphor and found them
inconclusive. We have reviewed the developmental literature and found it
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inadequate. For the most part it establishes that as children get older they
get better at doing certain things. We have reviewed the adult literature
and found it wanting, although often of better quality. The diagnosis that
we offered was that the empirical research suffered from the effects of an
inadequate working definition of the phenomenon being investigated. These
effects concern lack of adequate controls. All too often there is nothing
with which to compare the comprehension of metaphors. Finally, we attempted
to provide a definition of metaphor that would satisfy the needs of
meaningful empirical research. We suggested that a profitable approach might
be to manipulate contexts to induce different interpretations of a target
sentence. Such targets offer better prospect for paraphrase than do part-
sentence metaphors. Our own experience is that this paradigm is very
effective. It was used by Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds and Antos (in press)
in a reaction time study to show that the kind of analysis offered by Searle
(Note 4) seems to best fit cases of metaphoric comprehension wherein there is
minimal contextual support, perhaps reflecting a deliberate inferential
strategy on the part of the comprehender. As the amount of contextual
support increased, so did it become increasingly difficult to discriminate
between the comprehension of literal language and the comprehension of
metaphorical language in the sense that the evidence for the additional time
required to engage in special processes disappeared.
The psychological study of metaphor is about to ripen. Its fruits
promise to be useful both theoretically, in psycholinguistics, and
practically, in education. Perhaps this review can contribute to the
ripening.
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